This work makes an analysis of the determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of Brazilian firms, as proxied by firm membership of the ISE Index of BM&FBOVESPA. Besides other proposed determinants of CSR present in the literature (firm size, profitability, growth opportunities), the work examines ownership concentration and the persistence on CSR status. Logit regression estimates have been run for a sample of 1649 firm-year observations in the period 2006-2011. The findings show that CSR of Brazilian firms is inversely correlated to its ownership concentration indicating that controlling voting shareholders may not see social concerns as a priority. Besides, firms tend to maintain their present CSR status. The results also indicate that leading CSR firms are larger, face more growth opportunities, and are persistent in their superior CSR situation.
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INTRODUCTION
he increasing social and environmental demands have pressured firms to worry about social concerns, their operation and sustainability, being compromised with a broader range of stakeholders than the three ones articulated under the Agency Theory framework -shareholders, CEO and creditors -(JENSEN; MECKLING, 1976) . Literature has highlighted that the demands of a larger spectrum of stakeholders motivate firms to worry about a sustainable approach, encompassing harmoniously, economic, social, and environmental concerns, in a way that firms, besides being profitable, become also sustainable and socially responsible (LÓPEZ; GARCIA; RODRIGUES, 2007 ).
An important stream of research has sought to find the motivating factors for the development of corporate social concerns at the firm level (LERNER; FRYXELL, 1988; CHIH; CHIH; CHEN, 2010; ANDRADE et al., 2013) . In this context, the assessment of CSR becomes relevant. Assessing the degree of attention a firm directs to Corporate Social actions is a complex task on which there is still no agreement as can be depicted from the diversity of measures used (GRIFFIN; MAHON, 1997; MARGOLIS; WALSH, 2003; ORLITZKY; SCHMIDT; RYNES, 2003) . The assessment of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) by specialized institutions that have created indexes of CSR that intend to be able to convey information about the level of firms' CSR has become usual (STATMAN, 2006) . Examples of such market indexes are the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) of the New York Stock Exchange, the FTSE-4Good, in the London Stock Exchange, and the Johannesburg index in South Africa. In this context, in Brazil, the Corporate Sustainability Index (ISE) of BM&FBOVESPA has been created.
This work aims to study the determinants of CSR of Brazilian firms. To this end, we use a sample of listed Brazilian firms in the period 2006-2011, using as proxy for higher CSR the annual membership to the ISE index.
The findings have shown that ownership concentration has an adverse effect on the probability that a firm is in the ISE index. At the same time, previous status of composing the ISE index increase the probability of a firm being in the ISE today. Additionally, larger firms, firms with more growth opportunities, and more profitable firms tend to present higher probability of composing the ISE index.
Relevant literature has highlighted the need for further research looking for a sound explanation about how ownership structure moderates firm CSR in distinct institutional contexts (AGUILERA et al., 2007; DAM; SCHOLTENS, 2012) . In this vein, this work has been developed in an specific institutional environment, an emerging economy, which has also been required ZHANG, 2010) . From a theoretical perspective this research work offers additional insights on the determinants of corporate social responsibility in Brazil. The work builds on the rationale of the Agency Theory by analyzing the role played by ownership concentration on firm policies. The paper provides evidence on the negative effect of ownership concentration on CSR, proxied by the pertinence to the ISE index. As proposed by the literature, dispersed ownership concentration tends to be associated with higher public accountability, contrary to concentrated ownership, which is the picture in Latin American countries, as is the case of Brazil, where the interests of large controlling shareholders may be detrimental to firm accountability. The work also takes into account a set of other possible relevant determinants for firm social concerns. Another contribution of the work is the assessment of social performance status persistence, which is a reality in Brazil, indicating firms' concerns with reputation and legitimacy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents theoretical background and hypotheses. Sample and methodology are detailed in section 3. Results are analyzed in section 4 that is followed by the conclusions of the work.
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND HYPOTHESES

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
In 1953, Howard R. Bowen, in his important book "Social Responsibilities of the Businessman", argued that society's expectations drive firm social responsibility, an idea that is still present although the need to find an adequate definition for firm social responsibility.
Relevant definitions for Corporate Social Responsibility have advocated that it is related to firm concerns that are beyond the economic and market relations, but that also integrates compliance with legal requirements, ethical expectations, and respect to a broad spectrum of stakeholders and the natural environment (CARROLL, 1979; 1999; CROWTHER; ARAS, 2008) .
Along with the evolution of sustainable development concerns since the 1980s, three main concepts have been pointed out as the pillars of firm social concerns (social, economic and environmental) (GARRIGA; MELÉ, 2004; DAHLSRUD, 2008 (SHRIVASTAVA, 1995; CARROLL, 1999; BITTENCOURT; CARRIERE, 2005; DAHLSRUD, 2008) .
As previously mentioned, the growing social and environmental demands over firms has emerged the need to assess firm's social responsibility. This has given rise to a variety of measures at the firm level (LERNER; FRYXELL, 1988; STATMAN, 2006; CHIH; CHIH et al., 2010; ANDRADE; BRESSAN et al., 2013) . 
Persistence on CSR
The importance given to social responsibility suggests that firms are aware of the importance of firm social policy, as a consequence of the expanding social and environmental demands over firms. Firm legitimacy, a kind of "social contract" between firm and society, is associated to proper and desirable actions of a firm within a social system (DEEPHOUSE; CARTER, 2005) . Building on the Legitimacy Theory that proposes that firms try to legitimize their actions (DEEGAN, 2002; TILLING; TILT, 2010) , it is plausible to propose that firm may use CSR for that. Regardless the reasons for disclosing CSR, the purpose to legitimize firms' activities is to gain legitimacy with relevant stakeholders (DOWLING; PFEFFER, SUCHMAN, 1995; DEEGAN, 2002) . By undertaking CSR policy and disclosing it, directly or being evaluated externally and composing CSR indexes (STATMAN, 2006; ANDRADE; BRESSAN et al., 2013) , the firm signals its concern with CSR to the market and society as a whole. The way back in this process may be a negative signal with adverse consequences on the firm legitimacy process. By adopting certain social actions and reaching a certain degree of CSR, it is plausible to propose that a firm will try to increase, or, at least, maintain its present CSR, in a way to show to different stakeholders that the firm is actually committed to such concerns. This rationale leads to a hypothesis proposal that firms try to keep their CSR status, as follows: 
Growth opportunities and CSR
Firm's Growth opportunities have been seen as capable to moderate the intensity of social actions. The need to seize growth opportunities requires firm capacity to raise external funds for investment. Raising funds for firm financing requires the firm to be committed with social and sustainability standards, which is increasingly important in the funding market.
Literature on corporate social responsibility has highlighted such relevance and the positive sensitivity between growth opportunities and CSR (ARTIACH et al., 2010; LOURENÇO; CASTELO BRANCO, 2013) . This line of reasoning suggests that the firm with growth opportunities may be more prone to look for high CSR standards in order to be well regarded by the funding market as proposed in the following hypothesis: 
Profitability and CSR
Stakeholder theorists argue that concern with a broad spectrum of stakeholders does not exclude the trio shareholder-manager-creditor (FREEMAN 
Firm size and CSR
Despite arguments about the possible effect of firm size on CSR are still controversial (ORLITZKY, 2001; UDAYASANKAR, 2008; BAUMANN-PAULY et al., 2013) , firm size has been an important control variable in research on determinants of CSR. The argument about the positive effect of firm size on CSR posits that larger firms have more capacity to provide infrastructure and financial resources to undertake social policy. Besides, as the firm grows it becomes more visible and interacts with a broader spectrum of stakeholders experiencing greater demand for firm social responsibility, leading to higher level of mutual interference between business and society. In this sense, firm size seems to become more relevant for CSR. Bigger firms tend to be charged for shareholders and society at large so that they are more compelled to integrate social concerns and ethical conduct (ULLMAN, 1985; ORLITZKY, 2001; ARTIACH; LEE et al., 2010; ZIEGLER; SCHRÖDER, 2010; ANDRADE; BRESSAN et al., 2013; LOURENÇO; CASTELO BRANCO, 2013) . In this regard we propose the hypothesis that larger firms will be more prone to undertake social policy, leading to better CSR, as summarized in the following hypothesis that predicts a positive effect of firm size on CSR: HI5 is the Herfindahl index for voting ownership concentration in hands of the five main shareholders. OWC (1 to 5) refers to the sum of voting shares (%) in hands of the main, the two main, and so forth, until the five main shareholders. ROA is return on assets. GROP stands for growth opportunities, proxied by Tobin's Q. SIZE proxies for firm size, being calculated as Ln of total assets.
RESULTS
Advancing in the descriptive analysis it is worth mentioning that ISE and Non ISE firms are, indeed, different as can be seen in Table 3 HI5 is the Herfindahl index for voting ownership concentration in hands of the five main shareholders. OWC (1 to 5) refers to the sum of voting shares (%) in hands of the main, the two main, and so forth, until the five main shareholders. ROA is return on assets. GROP stands for growth opportunities, proxied by Tobin's Q. SIZE proxies for firm size, being calculated as Ln of total assets. Non parametric test is Mann-Whitney. Table 4 exhibits correlation coefficients for variable models. As can be seen, there is a trend for a negative correlation between the probability of composing the ISE index and ownership concentration. On the other direction, profitability, growth opportunities and firm size seems to be positively correlated with the presence of firm in the ISE index.
BBR, Braz. Bus. Rev. (Engl. ed., Online) , Vitória, v. 13, n. 4, Art. 4, p. 72 -93, jul-aug. 2016 www.bbronline.com.br ,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0, ,000) (0,554) (0,144) (0,121) (0,676) (0,538) (0,266) (0,000) (0,000) Notes: HI5 is the Herfindahl index for voting ownership concentration in hands of the five main shareholders. OWC (1 to 5) refers to the sum of voting shares (%) in hands of the main, the two main, and so forth, until the five main shareholders. ROA is return on assets. GROP stands for growth opportunities, proxied by Tobin's Q. SIZE proxies for firm size, being calculated as Ln of total assets. Correlation coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) exhibited.
Our main results can be depicted from logit model estimates that have the pertinence to the ISE index as the dependent variable. As hypothesized, voting ownership concentration has shown to affect negatively firm Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), as proxied by the probability of a firm being in the ISE index (Table 5 ). This result is consistent with models estimated with different measures of ownership concentration, the sum of voting stocks in hands of the five main shareholders (OWC1, OWC2, OWC3, OWC4, OWC5), and also by the Herfindahl index among the five main stockholders (HI5). Such result is consistent with the argument that large controlling shareholders may not see social policy, including social and environmental concerns, as relevant.
BBR, Braz. Bus. Rev. (Engl. ed., Online) , Vitória, v. 13, n. 4, Art. 4, p. 72 -93, jul-aug. 2016 www.bbronline.com.br Dependent variable is the dummy ISE that signals the pertinence of firm i to the ISE index in year t. HI5 is the Herfindahl index for voting ownership concentration in hands of the five main shareholders. OWC (1 to 5) refers to the sum of voting shares (%) in hands of the main, the two main, and so forth, until the five main shareholders. ROA is return on assets. GROP stands for growth opportunities, proxied by Tobin's Q. SIZE proxies for firm size, being calculated as Ln of total assets. Industry dummies exhibited: sd1 = Petroleum and fuel products; sd2 = Chemicals, Paper products, Metal-mechanical; sd3 = Equipment, Electrical machinery, and transport equipment; sd4 = Building and transportation; sd5 = Food products and beverages and tobacco; sd6 = Textile, clothing, leather and footwear; sd8 = Communication; sd9 = Electrical, Water supply and sanitary services; sd10 = Financial. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of the coefficients at 1, 5, and 10% levels.
The negative effect of ownership concentration over corporate social responsibility found in this work is in line with previous works in Brazil (NUNES; TEIXEIRA et al., 2010; LOURENÇO; CASTELO BRANCO, 2013) , and in distinct scenarios like Europe and China (LI; ZHANG, 2010; LÓPEZ-DE-FORONDA, 2011) . The explanation of such results is related to the fact that the reduced number of controlling shareholders, which is linked to high ownership concentration, has effects on agency relations. At the same that it contributes to the reduction of agency conflicts between managers and owners through better management monitoring and alleviating the free-rider problem, it may also favor the exacerbation of private benefits of control (DYCK; ZINGALES, 2004; RIYANTO; TOOLSEMA, 2008 Results in Table 6 refer to the alternate model of equation (1) that includes the lagged effect of the pertinence to the ISE index. Indeed, there seems to be persistence of Brazilian firms in composing the ISE index. The previous pertinence to the ISE index (ISE t-1 ) has a positive effect on the present situation (ISE). This is an indication that firms worry about keeping their CSR status, avoiding its decrease which would be a negative signal to society.
This finding may be linked to firm reputation and legitimacy purposes. By disclosing social and sustainability actions the firm signals its concerns with CSR to the market and to an ample spectrum of stakeholders (DOWLING; PFEFFER, 1975; SUCHMAN, 1995; DEEGAN, 2002) . Once starting such disclosure it seems to important to maintain the practice, otherwise it may be a negative signal with possible negative effect on the legitimacy process.
The adverse effect of ownership concentration has been confirmed in these alternate models. It is worth mentioning that growth opportunities (GROP) and firm size (SIZE) are positively correlated to the probability of the firm being present in the ISE index as hypothesized. Dependent variable is the dummy ISE that signals the pertinence of firm i to the ISE index in year t. HI5 is the Herfindahl index for voting ownership concentration in hands of the five main shareholders. OWC (1 to 5) refers to the sum of voting shares (%) in hands of the main, the two main, and so forth, until the five main shareholders. ROA is return on assets. GROP stands for growth opportunities, proxied by Tobin's Q. SIZE proxies for firm size, being calculated as Ln of total assets. Industry dummies exhibited: sd1 = Petroleum and fuel products; sd2 = Chemicals, Paper products, Metal-mechanical; sd3 = Equipment, Electrical machinery, and transport equipment; sd4 = Building and transportation; sd5 = Food products and beverages and tobacco; sd6 = Textile, clothing, leather and footwear; sd8 = Communication; sd9 = Electrical, Water supply and sanitary services; sd10 = Financial. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of the coefficients at 1, 5, and 10% levels.
As theoretically expected, growth opportunities contribute positively for the firm pertinence to the ISE index. At the same time that a firm with growth opportunities needs to use all available funds to maximize such opportunities, this firm also needs to show that adopts high standards of social policy, signaling also sustainability concerns. This is important in the financial market. This finding of the positive influence of growth opportunities on CSR is in accordance with the proposal of hypothesis 3 and previous results in the international arena, and also in Brazil (ARTIACH; LEE et al., 2010; ZIEGLER; SCHRÖDER, 2010; LOURENÇO; CASTELO BRANCO, 2013) .
It is also worth mentioning the positive effect of firm size on the probability of the firm being component of the ISE portfolio, as theoretically proposed in hypothesis 5, based on the , 2001; 2003; ORLITZKY; SCHMIDT et al., 2003) . In this work, the positive sensitivity found, which is in accordance with the slack resources theory,
indicates that the higher profitability increases the probability of a firm composing the ISE index.
CONCLUSIONS
Literature has looked for determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
Recently, research has given attention to the possible role played by ownership structure on firm social policy, due to reputational concerns, visibility, and the search for legitimizing firm controlling shareholders seem to pursue private benefits of control, leaving aside the interests of other stakeholders that could benefit from firm social and sustainability concerns. This result is in line with argument that more dispersed ownership could capture the interests of investors with social concerns that has no power in high concentrated ownership.
Besides the adverse effect of ownership concentration on CSR, additional results are important to be highlighted. Previous membership to the ISE index has shown to increase the present probability of a firm being a member of the ISE index in the current year. That means that Brazilian firms try to maintain its CSR status, as considered by the membership to the ISE index. This is in accordance with the proposals that firms worry about legitimacy and We see some avenues of research following this work. The search for other measures for CSR is a constant challenge highlighted in the literature and deserves attention since the use of dummy variable is more limited than a detailed continuous measure. In this vein, it seems to be fruitful the use of other CSR. Additionally, we also envision the study of specific sectors as valuable.
Studying the effect of other ownership structure characteristics of Brazilian firms also emerges as another avenue for research. Future works could take into account, for example, insider ownership or the ownership of certain blockholders like institutional investors, government or other firms.
